P i : S 1 × · · · × S n → R (i = 1, .
. . , n) . The set S i is called Player i's strategy space. The function P i is called Player i's payoff function.
This formulation is general enough to model pretty much any real-world strategic interaction: we take S i to be the set of actions available to the character called Player i, we imagine that each player must choose some action, we imagine that those actions have some joint consequence and that P i measures Player i's assessment of the value of that consequence. Given such a model, one can ask questions that tend to fall into two broad categories: First, what do we think the players will do (assuming, ordinarily, that they are sublimely selfish and sublimely rational)? Second, what do we think the players ought to do (according to some standard of fairness or justice or morality)? Questions of the first sort call for solution concepts; questions of the second sort call for normative criteria.
The most thoroughly studied solution concept is Nash equilibrium, an outcome that results when players maximize their own payoffs, taking other players' behavior as given. More precisely, an n-tuple of strategies (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is a Nash equilibrium if for every i and for every s ∈ S i , P Nash equilibrium either is or is not a good predictor of actual behavior depending on exactly what sort of behavior is being modeled.
Turning now to normative criteria (criteria intended to judge the desirability of outcomes), the least controversial is the criterion of ParetoOptimality. Given two n-tuples of strategies s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) and s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ), we say that s (weakly) Pareto dominates s if P i (s) ≥ P i (s ) for all i; it is easy to verify that Pareto dominance is a partial order, and we say that s is Pareto optimal if it is maximal for this order.
In general, we have no guarantees of existence or uniqueness for Nash equilibria or for Pareto optima. When they do exist, Nash equilibria and Pareto optima might or might not coincide. The single most famous example in the history of game theory is the Prisoner's Dilemma, one form of which can be represented by the following matrix:
(1)
Here the rows are indexed by Player 1's strategy set {C, D}, the columns are indexed by Player 2's strategy set {C, D} , and the (i, j) entry is (P 1 (i, j), P 2 (i, j)). (D, D) is also the unique outcome that is not Pareto optimal. Rational selfish prisoners always choose the one strategy pair that both can agree is undesirable-in the sense that they would both prefer (C, C). 1 The simplest game without a Nash equilibrium is "odds and evens", represented by the game matrix
Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium in which Player 1 plays Even. Then Player 2 plays Odd, so Player 1 plays Odd-contradiction; and similarly with Odd and Even reversed. Thus there is no Nash equilibrium, and without an alternative solution concept we are unable to predict anything other than paralysis on the part of both players. But of course anyone who has ever played this game knows what actually happens: players randomize their strategies, and each wins half the time.
One might be tempted to conclude that Nash equilibrium is the wrong solution concept for this game. A better conclusion is that the mathematical structure (2) is a poor model for the real-world game of odds and evens. A better model would allow for mixed (i.e. randomized) strategies. So we replace the strategy space S i = {Odd, Even} with the unit interval S + i = [0, 1] , using p ∈ [0, 1] to model the strategy "play Odd with probability p and Even with probability 1 − p". It is then natural to define new payoff functions
More generally, given any game G with finite strategy sets S i , we define a new game G + as follows: Let S + i be the set of all probability distributions on S i , and define
(The restriction to games with finite strategy sets is so that we do not have to worry about convergence issues in (3).) One proves via standard fixed point theorems that the game G + has at least one Nash equilibrium, the key point being that each S + i , unlike the original S i , can be identified with a convex subset of a Euclidean space on which the P + i are continuous.
Thus in the case of Odds and Evens, G + is a better model of reality than G is. I want to argue that the same thing is true more generally: If G is any game with finite strategy spaces intended to model some real-world interaction, then G + is always a better model of that same interaction. Here's why: In the real world, players must communicate their strategies either to each other or to a referee or to an interrogating detective, who then computes the payoffs. And as a practical matter, it is quite impossible for a referee or anyone else to prohibit the use of mixed strategies. Player 1 announces "I defect!" How can the referee know whether Player 1 arrived at this strategy through a legal deterministic process or an illegal random one?
Because there is no way to prohibit mixed strategies in practice, we might as well allow them in the model. More generally, whenever the real world imposes limits on referees' ability to observe and/or calculate, we should improve the model by adjusting the strategy spaces and payoff functions accordingly.
Quantum game theory begins with the observation that the technology of the (near?) future is likely to dictate that much communication will occur through quantum channels. (D, D) is a Nash equilibrium. VOLUME 51, NUMBER 4 therefore cannot prohibit: Instead of cooperating or defecting (or randomizing between the two), a player might send a message that is some quantum superposition of the messages "I cooperate" and "I defect". To read the message, the referee must destroy the superposition, along with any evidence that the superposition ever existed, which makes superpositions effectively impossible to prohibit. What cannot be prohibited must be allowed; therefore, if we want to model accurately the behavior of games in which players have access to "quantum moves", we should expand our strategy spaces accordingly.
One might guess that a quantum move is just one more way to implement a mixed strategy, so that there is nothing new here for game theory. The physicist David Meyer [M] was the first to publish a counterexample to that guess. In Meyer's example a single coin is passed back and forth between two blindfolded players. The coin starts out heads up (call this state H). Player One has the option either to flip the coin or to return it unflipped. Then Player Two (still blindfolded so he doesn't know Player One's first move) has the same option: Flip or don't flip. And finally, Player One gets another turn. If the coin ends up in its initial state H, Player One wins. If it ends up in the opposite state T (tails up), Player Two wins.
Here Player One has four strategies ("flip, flip", "flip, don't flip", etc.). Player Two has two strategies ("flip" and "don't flip"). In any mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, Player Two flips with probability .5, Player One flips an even number of times with probability .5, and each wins half the games. Now suppose we treat the coin as a quantum object. Its state is an equivalence class of nonzero vectors in the complex vector space spanned by H ("heads") and T ("tails"); two vectors are equivalent if one is a scalar multiple of the other. A physical operation on the coin corresponds to a unitary operation on the state space; in particular, we can set things up so the operation "not flip" is represented by the identity transformation and the operation "flip" is represented (with respect to the basis {H, T} ) by the unitary matrix
Now suppose that Player One (but not Player Two) has access to a full array of quantum moves; that is, instead of simply flipping or not flipping, he can apply any unitary matrix he chooses. In particular, if he is clever, Player One will choose the matrix 
whereas if Player Two flips, the net result is
This is great for Player One, because both (4) and (5) map the state represented by H into itself (remember that any scalar multiple of H is equivalent to H). Thus whether or not Player Two flips the coin, Player One is guaranteed a win.
Meyer's example shows that quantum moves can be more powerful than mere mixed strategies, at least in a context where quantum moves are available to only one player. But of course it is more natural to ask what happens if both players are given access to a full set of quantum moves.
The first example of a full-fledged quantum game is due to Jens Eisert, Martin Wilkens, and Maciej Lewenstein [EWL] . Let G be a two-by-two game, that is, a game with two players, each of whom has a two-point strategy space, say {C, D}.
(The reader will have no difficulty extending this construction to n-by-m games.) Each player is given a coin that he returns to the referee either in its original state (to indicate a play of C) or flipped (to indicate a play of D). A player with access to quantum moves can act on his coin with any unitary matrix and therefore return it in a state αH + βT where α and β are arbitrary complex numbers, not both zero. (Here and in everything that follows I will freely abuse notation by writing αH + βT both for an element of the vector space C 2 and for the state represented by that vector.) When the referee observes the coin, it will appear to be unflipped or flipped with probabilities proportional to |α| 2 and |β| 2 . As long as the coins can be treated as independent quantum entities, then indeed all we have is a fancy way to implement a mixed strategy-in other words, nothing new for game theory.
Meyer's example was more interesting because both players acted on a single coin. Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein (referred to henceforth as EWL) make their example more interesting by assuming the players' coins are entangled so that there is a single state space for the pair of coins. Explicitly, let C 2 be the two-dimensonal complex vector space spanned by symbols H and T; then the state space for an entangled pair is
where ∼ is the equivalence relation that identifies a vector with all its nonzero scalar multiples. As before, I will write, for example, H ⊗ H both for a vector in the space C 2 ⊗ C 2 and for the state it represents. A physical operation on the first coin is represented by a two-by-two unitary matrix U acting on the state space S as U ⊗ 1. A physical operation on the second coin is represented by a two-by-two unitary matrix V acting on the state space as 1 ⊗ V T . Now EWL conjure the following scenario: A pair of coins starts in the state 2
(H ⊗ H) + (T ⊗ T).
As before, each player is handed one of the coins and invited to indicate a play of C by applying the identity matrix ("leaving the coin untouched") or to indicate a play of D by applying the matrix
("flipping the coin"). As long as the players restrict themselves to the two-point strategy space {C, D}, the pair of coins lands in one of the four states
The referee now performs an observation to determine which of the states (7a-d) the coins occupy and makes appropriate payoffs. If players cannot be trusted to restrict themselves to the two strategies C and D, then the mathematical modeler should replace the game G with a new game G Q that expands the strategy spaces accordingly. Player One's strategy space should consist of the operations that can be effected on the state space S (defined in (6)) via the action of unitary matrices on the first variable. Let U 2 be the group of two-by-two unitary matrices. The matrices that fix S are the scalar matrices, which form a subgroup S 1 ⊂ U 2 . Therefore, we define Player One's strategy space to be the group U 2 /S 1 .
Let SU 2 ⊂ U 2 be the subgroup of matrices with determinant one; then inclusion induces an isomorphism
so we can just as well define Player One's strategy space to be SU 2 /{±1}. Moreover, the group SU 2 can be identified with the group S 3 of unit quaternions via the map
The same analysis applies to Player Two. Thus we define the strategy spaces
Using language loosely, I will often identify a strategy with either of the two quaternions that represent it. Next we motivate definitions for the payoff functions. Start with the game G:
Suppose Player One plays the quaternion p and Player Two plays the quaternion q. Write the product as (10) pq = π 1 (pq) + π 2 (pq)i + π 3 (pq)j + π 4 (pq)k where the π α are real numbers unique up to a sign, because p and q are defined up to a sign. Using the notation of (7a-d), a chase through the isomorphisms reveals that the coin is transformed from the initial state CC to a final state π 1 (pq)CC + π 2 (pq)CD + π 3 (pq)DC + π 4 (pq)DD.
When the referee observes the coins' joint state, he observes each of the four outcomes with probabilities Prob (CC) = π 1 (pq) 2 Prob (CD) = π 2 (pq) 2 Prob (DC) = π 3 (pq) 2 Prob (DD) = π 4 (pq) 2 .
Thus we should define the payoff functions by Equations (8) and (11) define the quantum game G Q associated to the game G of equation (9). The quantum game G Q is not at all the same as the mixed strategy game G + . Using mixed strategies, the players can jointly effect some but not all probability distributions over the four possible outcomes; there is, for example, no pair of mixed strategies that can effect the probability distribution Prob (CC) = 1/2 Prob (CD) = 0 Prob (DC) = 0 Prob (DD) = 1/2.
By contrast, in the game G Q any probability distribution at all is realizable; in fact, more is true: taking Player One's strategy as given, Player Two can choose a strategy that effects any desired probability distribution. (Proof: Let Player One choose strategy p, and let r be an arbitrary unit quaternion; then Player Two can play p −1 r.)
Thus Nash equilibria must be a great rarity in quantum games; in fact, Nash equilibria exist only when there exists α ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} that maximizes both X α and Y α ; in other words, Nash equilibria exist only when there is no conflict between the players.
But nobody would ever actually play the game G Q anyway. Just as there is nothing to stop our players from adopting quantum strategies, there is also nothing to stop them from adopting mixed quantum strategies. So we really want to study the game
So far, we have defined the game G + only when the game G has finite strategy spaces, which is certainly not the case for G Q . So to turn (12) into a definition, we must first give a more general definition of G + .
Definition.
A measurable game consists of
2. n bounded measurable functions so that q is an optimal response to µ if and only if a = d = 0. Thus q = i , q = j are optimal responses; whence so is the strategy ν. Similarly with the players reversed. In the Nash equilibrium (13), each player's payoff is 5/2, so (13) Pareto dominates the unique classical equilibrium (D, D) (where the payoffs are both 1). Nevertheless, (13) is still Pareto suboptimal, being dominated by (C, C).
More generally, we would like to classify the Nash equilibria in G ! where G is an arbitrary twoby-two game. The results that follow are from the forthcoming article [L] .
Given a strategy µ, we define the optimal response sets O 1 (µ) = {p ∈ RP 3 |P 1 (p, µ) is maximized}, O 2 (µ) = {q ∈ RP 3 |P 2 (µ, q) is maximized}. 
